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Abstract 
 The main goal for this thesis is to review how the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s actions in Yemen’s civil war can be explained through the 
international relations theory Classical Realism. Studying Iran and Saudi Arabia’s rivalry 
is important for academic study because it creates an imbalance of power in the Middle 
East and intensifies security issues in the region. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia hold the 
most influential economic and political systems in the Middle East, presenting a dilemma 
for power and security between the two. There most recent example of this rivalry can be 
seen through their engagement in the Yemeni civil war. By invading the state sovereignty 
of Yemen to conduct a proxy war, Iran and Saudi Arabia have exemplified their desire to 
obtain regional hegemony. In this paper, I will utilize the zero-sum game and security 
dilemma, to explain Iran and Saudi Arabia’s motivations and participation in the Yemeni 
civil war. Furthermore, I will argue that Iran and Saudi Arabia are utilizing Yemen to 
obtain geostrategic power in their race towards regional hegemony.  
Keywords: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Classical Realism, zero-sum game, security 
dilemma, 1979 Islamic Revolution, 2003 invasion of Iraq, 2011 Arab Spring, Bab al-
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The Race to Regional Hegemony: A Case Study of the Iran-Saudi Rivalry in Yemen 
Iran and Saudi Arabia’s rivalry is influenced by political and religious ideology. 
After the death of the prophet Mohammed in 632 AD, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s 
communities have been deeply divided by religious sectarianism. The death of the 
prophet Mohammed presented a change in spiritual leadership which was contended and 
resulted in two different sects of Islam. These sects include Shi’a Islam and Sunni Islam, 
with Iran and Saudi Arabia both exercising different fundamental interpretations of Islam 
(Arthington, 2019). This religious sectarianism has spread into their political structures, 
with Iran functioning under a quasi-democracy and Saudi Arabia functioning under a 
monarchy (Wehrey, et.al, 2009). Through Iran’s interpretation of Islam, Islam rejects any 
monarchial power in its political ideology which has created tension in Iranian-Saudi 
relations (Wehrey, et.al, 2009). These justifications have been utilized in academic 
studies to explain the Iranian-Saudi rivalry. However, these factors are only a small 
contribution towards the Iranian-Saudi rivalry and cannot be utilized to explain the 
rivalry in its entirety.  
           Despite popular beliefs that their rivalry is fueled by different variations in 
religious ideology Iran and Saudi Arabia's rivalry is deeply rooted by the motivation to 
obtain regional hegemony in the Middle East, and Yemen has been the most recent area 
to examine their rivalry within the IR theory Classical Realism. Actions that Iran and 
Saudi Arabia have exercised in Yemen, reveal their desire to gain control of oil 
transportation to promote their influence in the Middle East and strengthen their 
economic power. In 2015, Saudi Arabia took advantage of the political instability in 
Yemen and conducted an air-strike campaign in support of the nationally recognized 
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government (Sharp, 2019, pg.2). In contrast, Iran supported the nonstate actor 
challenging the nationally recognized government by providing military training and 
military equipment (Sharp, 2019, pg. 2). While this has further destabilized Yemen, it has 
created a power vacuum for Iran and Saudi Arabia to exploit. This foreign intervention 
has been masked as a religious ideology war, but the true motive can be explained 
through Yemen’s geostrategic location along the Red Sea. While previous reports suggest 
the proxy war being conducted by Iran and Saudi Arabia in Yemen has backing through 
religious sectarianism, the ultimate factor can be explained through the simple concept of 
power. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are motivated by regional hegemony because they 
believe that having more power than their neighbors is the only avenue for security. 
Through this paper, Yemen will be revealed as the current arena that houses Iran and 
Saudi Arabia’s race to regional hegemony because of the geostrategic advantage it holds.  
This thesis seeks to present a rationalization of Iran and Saudi Arabia’s rivalry through 
the lens of Classical Realism with Yemen functioning as a case study example. Classical 
Realism functions in an anarchic self-help system, which is exemplified in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia’s invasion of Yemen’s state sovereignty. Their continuous behavior in Yemen 
exemplifies their pursuit of regional hegemony by obtaining geostrategic control of the 
Bab al-Mandeb strait.  
Regional Rivals 
Iran and Saudi Arabia share comparative advantages in the international 
community. Iran's boundaries encompass approximately 1,648,195 square kilometers 
with 10.8% arable land (CIA Factbook, 2020). Saudi Arabia's boundaries encompass 
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approximately 2,149,690 square kilometers with 1.5% arable land (CIA Factbook, 2020). 
In terms of geographical power, Iran is strategically located along the Strait of Hormuz 
and is surrounded by rugged, mountainous terrain (CIA Factbook, 2020). In comparison, 
Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the world to not have a single river but has access 
to extensive coastlines on the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea which provide a strategic 
advantage for shipping (CIA Factbook, 2020). Geographically, Saudi Arabia consists 
predominantly of arid deserts, which places them at a disadvantage to Iran's fortifiable 
geographic location. 
Iran and Saudi Arabia are both identified as sustaining oil-reliant economies (CIA 
Factbook, 2020). Statistical data taken in 2017 estimates Iran’s economy to be at $1.64 
trillion USD with Saudi Arabia’s economy at $1.775 trillion (CIA Factbook, 2020). Both 
states operate with services being their prominent form of labor forces, with goals to 
diversify their economies in the future (CIA Factbook, 2020).  In the event Iran and Saudi 
Arabia engaged in a direct hostile conflict with the other, it would prove detrimental to 
either obtaining their goal of regional hegemony. Furthermore, it would remove each 
player from the competition, and result in a new power vacuum being created in the 
Middle East. 
Historical Background 
           Iran and Saudi Arabia’s rivalry has been shaped by three historical events. These 
events have challenged religious authority, shifted balances of power in the Middle East, 
and created avenues for Iran and Saudi Arabia’s current struggle towards regional 
hegemony. To fully understand Iran and Saudi Arabia’s rivalry it is important to analyze 
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the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, and the Arab 
Spring.  
In 1979, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia reached a pivotal moment in 
the wake of Iran’s Islamic Revolution (Okruhlik, 2003). This revolution sparked a 
significant argument over power struggles within Islam. Previously divided into the 
Sunni and Shia sects, the Iranian revolution evoked the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran and 
established a religious centered government (Okruhlik, 2003). Under new political 
leadership, Iran challenged Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy as the religious leader of Islam and 
established itself as the religious leader of all Shi’a communities in the Middle East 
(Okruhlik, 2003). The Islamic Revolution holds significance when the economic 
influences of the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca are explored.  
During the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Khomeini threatened the sovereignty of 
the Al Saud family (Okruhlik, 2003). Following under the traditional Shiite belief that a 
descent of Muhammed should be the leader of Islam; Khomeini threatened the legitimacy 
of Saudi Arabia which has become the leading state in Islam. Saudi Arabia houses the 
two holy sites of Islam within its borders. These include Mecca and Medina, which are 
frequently visited by Muslims across the world. Hajj is among one of the five pillars of 
Islam and is mandatory for any Muslim who is financially and physically capable 
(Maher, 2012). Hajj can cost approximately six thousand USD for a singular traveler 
(Maher, 2012). Annually, the Hajj generates an average of ten billion USD towards Saudi 
Arabia's economy (Maher, 2012). In 2016, Iran banned its citizens from traveling for the 
Hajj, due to political differences with Saudi Arabia (Teng 2016). This resulted in Saudi 
Arabia losing the revenue of 600,000 Iranians who had planned to complete the Hajj 
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(Teng 2016). The Islamic Revolution in 1979 opened a new avenue for Iran to challenge 
Saudi Arabia’s power in the region and has created further pathways of dissent between 
the two states. 
Between 1980-1988, Saudi Arabia supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War 
(Okruhlik, 2003). This blatant stance against Iran to monopolize on power in the region, 
created open, hostile rhetoric towards Saudi Arabia. Iran openly declared that Saudi 
Arabia was “un-Islamic” and tried to plummet their oil sales, which serves as its primary 
export and source of revenue (Okuruhlik, 2003). However, with the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, Iran’s counterweight of power shifted, and Iran had more freedom of maneuver 
(Okruhlik, 2003). Under the Clinton and Bush administration the United States presented 
a grand strategy that resembled a realist approach in handling the unrest in the Middle 
East. Concerned about oil revenue, as well as global terrorism, the United States became 
heavily involved in the conflicts surrounding the region and created a shift in the balance 
of power (Bromund, 2018).  
Under the Obama administration, a strategy that resembled liberalism was put into 
effect. In an attempt to create peace, the Obama administration began to withdraw from 
the conflicts in the Middle East (Bromund, 2018). This strategic move did not achieve its 
desired result, however, and instead created a power vacuum. With one of Saudi Arabia’s 
powerful allies weakened in the region, Iran began to advance (Bromund, 2018). Despite 
the liberalist approach under the Obama administration, the rivalry between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia continued to intensify. Through the lens of the Obama administration, their 
liberalist approach weathered the Arab Spring, the increase in violence in Syria, and the 
proxy war in Yemen. However, nothing was accomplished in terms of Iran and Saudi 
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Arabia’s rivalry, which is why liberalism is not the most effective approach to neutralize 
the Iran-Saudi rivalry.  
In 2011, the Arab Spring created another shift of power in the region. The Arab 
Spring sparked a revolution across the Middle East and North Africa and promoted 
democracy across the region. However, it also created dissent and revolution in weakened 
states, such as Yemen, and allowed Iran and Saudi Arabia to exert their power and 
influence across the Middle East. After the 2011 Arab Spring, Yemen’s citizens 
challenged their government and created an uprising which resulted in its collapse 
(Sharp, 2019, pg.9). In 2014, a nonstate actors referred to as the “Houthi Rebels” took 
control of Yemen’s capital, which resulted in Iran and Saudi Arabia exploiting the 
weakened political structure to fight for influence of Yemen’s geostrategic location 
(Sharp, 2019, pg.2). The Arab Spring created additional arenas for Iran and Saudi Arabia 
to challenge each other for regional hegemony. 
 
Literature Review: The Iranian-Saudi Rivalry 
The literature analysis of the Iranian-Saudi Rivalry has surged in waves based on 
political events and outcomes. Initially, the rivalry between The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran became a key topic of study after the events of 
the 1979 Iranian Revolution and reappeared in 2003 after the United States invasion of 
Iraq. The literature encompassing the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia seeks to 
explain the regional chaos through the lens of religious ideologies, political ideologies, 
and economic power. Several argue that the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has 
become a Cold war in the Middle East, which can be explained through the zero-sum 
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game (Pike, 1990). Nonetheless, each source can agree upon the assumption that the 
continuation of Iran and Saudi Arabia's rivalry has created political and economic chaos 
in the Middle East region. For this literature review, I will analyze literature composed by 
scholars who try to explain this rivalry based on religious differences, political 
ideologies, and historical assumptions that try to explain the two states' behaviors. 
  The invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003 has become a clear point of 
argument for literature regarding Saudi Arabia and Iran’s relationship. In an analysis of 
Iranian-Saudi relations conducted by Dr. Andrew Terrill at the United States Army War 
College, Terrill (2011) argues that the invasion of Iraq was a key concern in the rivalry 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Terrill, 2011, pg. 55). He continues by identifying that 
the United States had designated Iran as an "Axis of Evil" and chose to utilize Saudi 
Arabia to maintain regional stability which further divided the hostile relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Terill, 2011, pg. 27).  
According to Wehrey, the fall of Saddam Hussein, completely reshaped the 
regional balance of power in the Middle East and opened an entirely new playing field 
for Saudi Arabia and Iran (Wehrey, et.al, 2009, pg. ix). Where the United States had 
practiced engagement and containment in Iraq, they had created the opportunity for Saudi 
Arabia and Iran to engage in open competition and rivalry in the Levant and Gulf states 
(Wehrey, et.al, 2009, pg. xv). 
Various authors and scholars equate the Iranian-Saudi rivalry to a new era of Cold 
war that is sweeping across the Middle East. Talia Grumet at the University of Denver 
challenges that Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged in establishing political-ideological 
wars within the Middle East through what she refers to as "camps" (Grumet, 2015, pgs. 
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1-2). Wehrey argues that Saudi Arabia is fearful and “overreactive” of the 
implementation of Iran’s possible nuclear program, which would explain the utilization 
of political ideology being spread to promote either regional power (Wehrey, et.al, 2009, 
pg. xv). Terrill offers a similar assessment that argues that political ideology has played a 
key role in establishing the political agenda of both Muslim countries (Terrill, 2011, pg. 
1-2). Siddiqa in his assessment of the Cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, he claims 
that the only thing that Saudi Arabia and Iran have in common is their claim to 
“exceptionalism” (Siddiqa, 2018, pg. 108). Additionally, he argues that Saudi Arabia and 
Iran have been in strife since the 18th century, but Nixon’s doctrine of the Twin Pillar 
Policy is what actively began a Cold war between the two states (Siddiqa, 2018, pg. 
108).This is where the literature begins to morph political and religious ideology together 
in their assessments. While this can be inconvenient, it further emphasizes how deeply 
religion is utilized to establish political agendas in the Middle East. 
Both Wehrey and Grumet offers analysis towards religion being a key player in 
the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Grumet outlines that religion offers additional 
tension between the two states, because it has created strife in who is considered the 
leader of Islam (Grumet, 2015, pg. ii). While Saudi Arabia is represented by their unique 
interpretation of Sunni through Wahhabism, Iran's representation of Shi'ite Islam through 
Khomeinism establishes that in their ideology they both are the rightful leaders for the 
Islam community (Grumet, 2015, pg. ii).  
Wehrey continues this assessment by saying that Iran’s philosophy rejects any 
kind of monarchial regime, and they argue that the Al-Saud family has no custodianship 
of the two Islamic holy sites located within their borders (Wehrey, et. al, 2009, pg. x). 
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Siddiqa argues that the rise to power of Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, has 
shifted Saudi Arabia towards totalitarianism, which has created further political disparity 
between the two states (Siddiqa, 2018, pg. 110). This juxtaposes Iran’s political belief 
that Islam should incorporate quasi-democratic institutions (Wehrey, et. al, pg. x). 
Wehrey also argues that the religious war between the two countries is deepened by 
ethnic fissures and establishes that these two factors create a stage for “chronic hostility” 
(Wehrey, et. al, 2009, pg.x).  
The amount of literature available in discussion of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry 
utilizes the framework set forth by the Iraq invasion in 2003 alongside the fall of Saddam 
Hussein. Some have argued that the United States’ utilization of Saudi Arabia as a 
balancer in the region has furthered the zero-sum game mentality between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, while others argue that their rivalry is historically engrained from their religious 
differences. Each literature presented has justified the motivations of Saudi Arabia and 
Iran through either a religious superiority or political ideology framework, ultimately 
through the historical analysis of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iraq invasion. 
In contrast, I will argue that the Iranian-Saudi rivalry does not stem from one 
argument, but rather it is motivated by the all-encompassing idea of regional hegemony 
best explained through the international relations theory Classical realism. While others 
have utilized the Iraq invasion, I would like to change the terrain to view Saudi Arabia 
and Iran’s interaction in their proxy war in Yemen. Grumet briefly discusses how 
political “camps” have been spread all across the Middle East to support Saudi Arabia 
and Iran’s intentions for power, but I would like to further analyze the argument. Saudi 
Arabia and Iran want regional hegemony in the Middle East, and it simply cannot happen 
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through mere religious superiority or political ideology, but through every aspect and 
institution of power.  
Methodology  
Classical Realism is one of the dominant schools in the study of international 
relations and was established following World War II (Leiter, 2001). In modern society, 
it is utilized to explain international conflicts through theorizing on the nature of 
humankind and domestic factors (Lieter, 2001). There are four key principles of Classical 
Realism.   
• The first principle is that state actions and decisions are rooted in human 
nature. This has been analyzed by Morgenthau and Hobbes (Gibb, 2019). 
Morgenthau believed that society was governed by objective laws that are 
rooted in human nature Thomas Hobbes described human nature as selfish 
and is derived by human egos (Gibb, 2019)   
• The second principle is that the anarchical nature of international politics 
with no central authority influences the decisions of the states (Gibb, 2019). 
Machiavelli was the first to establish that the international system is in a 
constant state of anarchy, and that states should put the national interest above 
all else (Gibb, 2019). States should use available situations as a means of 
justifying further power and control.    
• The third principle is that there is a struggle for power in an anarchical 
self-help system (Gibb, 2019). Under this principle, the security dilemma is 
introduced (Gibb, 2019). Carr argues that the relationship between security 
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and power is the most important element in the political system (Gibb, 2019). 
In order to preserve that power and security states will takes efforts to increase 
their power while trying to balance deterring external threats (Gibb, 2019). 
Therefore, this principle states that power is the only way to protect the 
sovereignty of the state, and the idea of another state having more power 
makes them insecure (Gibb, 2019). This results in a zero-sum game.  
• The fourth principle discredits morality in international politics (Gibb, 
2019). This means that states are justified in their actions, because morality 
does not exist in the international system. Machiavelli argued that morality 
should be only be exercised within domestic politics and should not extend to 
the international sphere (Gibb, 2019). Carr challenges the concept of moral 
universalism, as well as the “harmony of interest” (Gibb, 2019). In his 
argument, Carr stated that “harmony of interests” is utilized by groups to 
maintain their power so that they can in the dominant position (Gibb, 2019). 
States cannot have comparable morals because each state views this subject 
differently.    
Under these four principles of Classical Realism, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s motivations 
can be explained. Iran and Saudi Arabia are both rational actors that exist to serve their 
best interests. This has been exemplified in their utilization of proxy wars throughout the 
region with prominent involvement circulating in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and 
Yemen (Sharp, 2019 pg.1).   
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Hegemony means "exercising a form of domination of control owing to the 
predominance of the capabilities of a state" (Raouf, 2019). Additionally, it can be defined 
as when "a singular powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system" 
(Raouf, 2019). Hegemony results from an uneven distribution of power resources (Raouf, 
2019). This stems from economic gain, as well as military gain. However, scholars on the 
issue stress that hegemonies are not solely built upon material power, but from the 
consent of the system they operate within (Raouf, 2019).   
Under Classical Realism, Thomas Hobbes argues that states will expand to gain more 
security (Leiter, 2001). This is the case with Iran and Saudi Arabia’s campaign 
throughout the Middle East, and their particular interest in gaining influence and control 
of the Bab al-Mandeb strait. It is evident that Iran and Saudi Arabia both function within 
a Classical Realism framework, and through their analysis the only way to gain absolute 
security is to obtain power through becoming a regional hegemon (Leiter, 2001). 
However, under the theory of zero-sum game, Classical Realism explains that all men 
want the same thing, but only one man can enjoy it (Leiter, 2001).   
In this case, Iran and Saudi Arabia want power and security but cannot obtain it 
unless they are the sole benefactors. Although, each opponent holds prominent power and 
influence, neither state will consider themselves safe if their opponent maintains power 
and influence. Therefore, in order to gain true security and power the opposing force 
must crush their opponent. Working within the anarchic system, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
have shifted their avenues towards power through engaging in a proxy war in Yemen 
(Sharp, 2019). Iran and Saudi Arabia’s actions show that their interests are within their 
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individual states. Iran and Saudi Arabia operates within an arena where there is no higher 
authority, which allows them to act in ways they promote their security and power above 
all else.  
Case Study: Yemen 
The Significance of Yemen  
 In 2011, Yemen’s government collapsed under the Arab Spring uprisings leaving 
a power vacuum for Iran and Saudi Arabia to exploit. In 2015, Saudi Arabia’s airstrike 
campaign against Yemen signified the beginning of a proxy war against Iran’s indirect 
endorsement of the nonstate actor in the northern section of Yemen (Sharp, 2019, pg. 2). 
Today, Yemen offers little significance to the international community and is 
internationally recognized as the world's worst humanitarian crisis (Roth, 2020). 
According to Freedom House, Yemen ranks eleven out of a hundred countries surveyed, 
and registers as a failed state with no sovereignty (Freedom House, 2020). Prior to the 
Civil War, Yemen was the poorest state in the Middle East and North African region and 
was comparable to the poorest states in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2020). 
Although it had unearned hope of becoming an oil-rich country, today Yemen has 
nothing to offer to the global community. 
Momentarily, in 1984, Yemen had hope of entering the global trade community as 
a lucrative producer in the oil and gas industry when the Hunt Oil Company discovered 
“commercial” oil reserves in southern Yemen (Miller, 1984). However, a report by the 
US Central Intelligence Agency later rebuked that claim and proved that the oil reserves 
in Yemen were heavily overcalculated (CIA Report, 1988). The argument stands that 
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there are limited oil reserves within Yemen’s borders, however, none that a country could 
capitalize on disqualifying the exploitation of Yemen based on natural resources.  
Saudi Arabia’s justification for warfare in Yemen stems from religious 
conviction, and fear for their own security along their southern border (BBC News, 
2020). In juxtaposition, Iran has made similar religious claims for their support of the 
Houthi Rebels. I disagree with these claims, and instead believe the focus should be 
shifted towards the economic gains that the Bab al-Mandeb strait can offer to Iran and 
Saudi Arabia's oil-reliant economies. 
Despite previous claims, Iran and Saudi Arabia are engaged in the Yemeni civil 
war based on geostrategic and economic gains. Although, religious and political ideology 
presents a small role in their motivations, Iran and Saudi Arabi's true intentions can be 
seen in the significance the Bab al-Mandeb strait holds in oil transportation. 
Geostrategic Importance 
The Bab al-Mandeb Strait is in the northern region of Yemen and holds 
geostrategic value to both Iran and Saudi Arabia (Sharp, 2019). According to US Energy 
Information Administration, an estimated 6.2 million barrels per day of crude oil travels 
through the Bab al-Mandeb strait towards Europe, the United States, and Asia (EIA, 
2019). This strait connects the Indian Ocean to one of the most geostrategic locations in 
the world and in order to enter the Red Sea and Suez canals, ships must travel through the 
Bab al-Mandeb strait (Calabrese, et.al, 2020). To avoid this strait, ships must travel 
around the southern hemisphere of Africa, which is increasingly expensive and dangerous 
(Calabrese, et.al, 2020).  
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The rationale for Saudi Arabia’s military campaign in Yemen circulates around 
retaining its power in the oil industry (Orkaby, 2019). Saudi Arabia's involvement in the 
Yemeni conflict is dedicated to the pursuit of oil security. Acting as a rational actor, 
Saudi Arabia has taken the necessary steps to proclaim its power in the oil production 
community. Pictured below, is a satellite image of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait from NASA 
(Bloomberg, 2018). At its narrowest point, the Bab al-Mandeb strait is approximately 
eighteen miles long, making it one of the most dangerous chokepoints in oil 
transportation from the Indian Ocean (EIA, 2019). The channel is divided by Perim 
Island, which increases the difficulty for large tanker ships to pass safely through the 
chokepoint (Bloomberg, 2018). The proximity of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to Eritrea and 
Djibouti, as well as Perim Island have created prime opportunities for piracy and 
terrorism (Bloomberg, 2018).  
 
A satellite view of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Photographer: USGS/NASA 
Landsat/Orbital Horizon via Getty Images. Retrieved from Bloomberg 
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Alternate routes are available for countries wishing to bypass the strait altogether, 
but they have proven to result in additional complications. To exemplify this point, the 
alternate voyage for a tanker ship to avoid the Bab al-Mandeb strait would subject it to 
travel around the southern tip of Africa (Bloomberg, 2018). If a tanker ship were to leave 
the exit of the Persian Gulf and travel around the southern tip of Africa to Houston it 
would increase its mileage by 2,660 nautical miles (Bloomberg, 2018). That consists of a 
28 percent increase. If the same tanker ship traveled to Augusta in Italy, its voyage would 
be three times as long, amounting to an additional 10,860 nautical miles (Bloomberg, 
2018). Instability in the Bab al-Mandeb strait could drastically deteriorate Saudi Arabia's 
oil shipments and create overarching crippling effects on its economy. The option to 
divert the Bab al-Mandeb strait or entirely remove it from global trade is not feasible, and 
the geostrategic power it holds could cause catastrophic effects to Saudi Arabia if it fell 
into the hands of an enemy instead of an ally. Additionally, if Saudi Arabia gained 
control of the Bab al-Mandeb strait Iran’s oil transportation out of the Strait of Hormuz 
would be threatened. In this case, the Bab al-Mandeb strait holds geostrategic gain for 
both of Iran and Saudi Arabia’s economy, and creates a security dilemma. Furthermore, 
the Bab al-Mandeb strait presents an availability for economic gain for Iran and Saudi 
Arabia.  
Economic Importance  
According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), Saudi Arabia's 
main exports are crude petroleum, refined petroleum, and petroleum gas (OEC, 2019). 
Crude oil accounts for 65 percent of its export, with crude petroleum amounting to 8.3% 
and petroleum gas amounting to 2.6% (OEC, 2019). This totals to Saudi Arabia's 
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economy operating from over 75% of oil products. With the vast amount of oil traveling 
through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the importance of Saudi Arabia is undeniable. To 
exemplify this further, in 2018, Houthi Rebels off the coast of Yemen utilized Iranian 
weapons to target two Saudi tanker ships (Bloomberg, 2018). This resulted in Saudi 
Arabia closing off their shipments from the area. Although, exact numerical data is not 
available, Saudi Arabia could only support this endeavor for a limited amount of time due 
to the economic backlash (Bloomberg, 2018). Although normal operation resumed within 
the week, the potential to create drastic changes to international shipping patterns was 
formulated. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration's report in 2014, 
closure of the Bab al-Mandeb strait, even temporarily could result in "substantial 
increases in total energy costs and world energy prices" (Henderson and Vaughan, 2017). 
The political environment circulating around the Bab al-Mandeb strait has created 
a zero-sum game that cannot be easily concluded. Alongside Saudi Arabia’s economic 
power within the channel, Iran also has significant economic power to obtain. Data from 
the OEC concludes that Iran’s main export is crude petroleum (OEC, 2019). Crude 
petroleum accounts for 72% of Iran’s economy, with refined petroleum amounting to 
2.6% (OEC, 2019).  
Saudi Arabia’s economic interests in Yemen do not consist solely on the control 
of the Bab al-Mandeb strait but extend further with the addition of future endeavors to 
construct a pipeline (Orkaby, 2019). Saudi Arabia's long-term goals in its southern border 
consist of constructing a pipeline through al-Mahra, which rests in Yemen’s easternmost 
region (Orkaby, 2019). When the civil war broke out in Yemen in 2014, Yemen seized 
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the opportunity to infiltrate the weakened government to complete the construction of its 
pipeline (Orkaby, 2019).  
However, with Iran's entrance into the internal conflict through their support of 
the Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia found themselves fortifying their southern border and 
unable to progress forward with construction (Orkaby, 2019). The construction of this 
pipeline was pursued under the intention of building a port in Nishtoon on Yemen’s 
southern coast (Orkaby, 2019). The Bab al-Mandeb strait is an area of insecurity for both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s economies, because they are both rentier states with oil-reliant 
economies. Restricting access to the Bab al-Mandeb strait for either Iran or Saudi Arabia 
would result in their exports being restricted to their western and European consumers, 
which could prove financially detrimental to both states. This factor has motivated Iran 
and Saudi Arabia’s rivalry to persist within Yemen and continues to promote their pursuit 
of regional hegemony by seeking to obtain an economic advantage over each other.  
The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia  
Iran and Saudi Arabia are comparable rivals, which has resulted in their 
competition being exemplified through proxy warfare, most prevalently in Yemen. Iran 
and Saudi Arabia have utilized the instability in Yemen to further advance their interests 
in the region.  
The Iranian-Saudi rivalry can be explained under the four principles of Classical 
Realism. Iran and Saudi Arabia are promoted to progress their domestic societies under 
an anarchic system, and further their interests through objectives laws that result in their 
state receiving the best outcome. Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia engage in the 
international system to promote the progression of another state, but instead remain 
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focused on the goals of their domestic structures. In the case of Yemen, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia are motivated to advance their economic interests in the region. The instability in 
Yemen is a threat towards their domestic oil markets, which resulted in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia engaging in warfare in the region. Furthermore, their goal is to progress the 
interests of their own society, which has resulted in what Thomas Hobbes refers to as 
selfish actions.  
Under the second principle of Classical Realism, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s actions 
in Yemen establishes their acceptance of the international system functioning as anarchic. 
Following under Machiavelli’s analysis, Iran and Saudi Arabia put their national interest 
above all else by partaking in actions that will persist their power and control. The 
Yemeni civil war has presented an arena for Iran and Saudi Arabia to advance their 
interests. Following the zero-sum game, Saudi Arabia seeks to obtain exclusivity in the 
Red Sea. Since Saudi Arabia and Iran’s economy is supported by oil production, the 
opportunity for another actor to obtain power of oil transportation removes security and 
power from their domestic structure. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia want to retain complete 
power for their state, which has been exemplified in their race to regional hegemony. 
However, that cannot be accomplished unless they maintain their economic structures. 
The instability in Yemen has furthered their interest in control of secure oil 
transportation. 
The third principle of Classical Realism can be explained through the security 
dilemma. Under the security dilemma, Iran’s participation in the Red Sea through their 
support of the “Houthi Rebels” in Yemen has threatened Saudi Arabia’s security. 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s airstrike campaign in Yemen in 2015 became an avenue for 
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Saudi Arabia to justify power and control of Yemen to protect their assets in the Red Sea. 
The actions of Iran and Saudi Arabia invalidated the state sovereignty of Yemen, and 
further emphasizes the assumption that under an anarchic system state will engage in 
open conflict.  
The fourth principle explains the Iran and Saudi Arabia’s justification for 
invading a state’s sovereignty and contributing to the worst humanitarian crisis in the 
world. Under Classical Realism, morality does not extend past the domestic market. 
Throughout this paper, the religious rivalry between the two has been explored, and can 
be explained under this principle of Classical Realism. Machiavelli’s analysis revealed 
that morality should remain in the domestic structure and should not extend into the 
international system. This is the case in the Iran-Saudi rivalry in Yemen. Inwardly, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia are motivated by different fundamental interpretations of Islam, but 
outwardly they function as rational actor that utilize their actions to progress their power 
and security. 
When viewing the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, it is simple to assume the rivalry could 
be resolved through engaging in direct warfare. However, Iran and Saudi Arabia have 
adapted to this outcome by engaging in proxy wars. Their goal is to obtain power in the 
region, and directly attacking the other opponent would result in a resource drain for both 
countries as well as an opportunity create another power vacuum in the region. The 
motivations and actions of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Yemen is properly analyzed through 
Classical Realism and allows a concise way to view the rivalry and its effects on other 
actors.  
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Conclusion 
 Iran and Saudi Arabia have proven to be two of the most influential actors in the 
Middle East yet remain stagnant in being able to overtake the other in their race towards 
regional hegemony. The pursuit of power and hegemony has landed Iran and Saudi 
Arabia in Yemen, where the Bab al-Mandeb strait offers an opportunity to gain control of 
oil transportation. Through historical analysis and current events, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
have demonstrated their pursuit of power and motivations to obtain regional hegemony. 
Iran and Saudi Arabia continue to function under the framework of Classical Realism, 
and their involvement in Yemen emphasizing their race to regional hegemony.  
 
Future Implications  
 The religious and ideological division between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not likely 
to be resolved, but future implications for their control of power in the Middle East can 
be consolidated. As their rivalry continues to persist throughout the Middle East, scholars 
have theorized that introducing a new counterweight to their rivalry might present a 
reduction to Iran and Saudi Arabia's rivalry. By replacing the counterweight that was 
removed during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran and Saudi Arabia would be restricted in 
their control and influence and would have to disperse their resources to promote their 
own security. By presenting a system that did not allow them to consolidate their power 
to challenge each other, the rivalry's influence in the region would dissuade regional 
hegemony. A future component that has risen in academic study in Turkey to challenge 
this rivalry, but the questions still remain on who will empower this state and how it 
would influence the balance of power in the Middle East (EKSI, 2017). 
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